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REGIMES OF KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICES: A DISCURSIVE ARCHEOLOGY ABOUT MADNESS

REGIMES DE SABERES E PRÁTICAS: UMA ARQUEOLOGIA DISCURSIVA SOBRE A LOUCURA

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Abstract

This text aims to present a horizontal reading, that is, a census of some elements that are part of the history of some regimes of knowledge and certain practices present in the discursivity of the seminal work “History of Madness in the Classical Age”, by Michel Foucault. To this end, madness is described from the regency prisms of empiricist, rationalist and positivist knowledge that structure the modulations of understanding madness as an object of knowledge according to which its own history traces different paradigms of approaches and, consequently, discursive propositions. distinct areas capable of managing regimes of knowledge and practices. The method used here is derived, contrary to what many preach, from Foucault's archeology of knowledge for which knowledge is only possible to be interpreted based on its multiple discursive manifestations within the social body in which it is in circulation. As results obtained, new ways of educating subjectivity and its multiple cultural manifestations in the contemporary collective circuit are found.
Keywords: Madness, Knowledge, Practices.

Resumo

Este texto tem por objetivo apresentar uma leitura horizontal es decir, un censo de algunos elementos que forman parte de la historia del conocimiento de alguns regimes de saber e certas práticas presentes na discursividade da obra seminal “História da loucura na idade clássica”, de Michel Foucault. Para tanto, descreve-se a loucura a partir dos prismas regenciais dos saberes empirista, racionalista e positivista que estruturam as modulações de compreensão da loucura como um objeto de saber segundo o qual sua própria história traça diferentes paradigmas de abordagens e, consequentemente, proposituras discursivas distintas capazes de gerenciar regimes de saber e práticas. O método empregado aqui é derivado, às avessas do que muitos pregam, da arqueologia do saber foucaultiana para a qual o saber somente é possível de ser interpretado a partir de suas múltiplas manifestações discursivas no interior do corpo social no qual se encontra em circulação. Como resultados obtidos, encontram-se novas formas de educar a subjetidade e suas multiplas manifestações culturais no circuito coletivo contemporâneo.
Palavras-chave: Loucura; Saber; Práticas.

1.INTRODUCTION

This text came from the exhibition entitled "The force of madness: regimes of knowledge and practices", held at the sixth meeting of the "Seminar on Madness - 60 years of Michel Foucault's History of Madness", the main reason for which is the "commemoration" of the 60th anniversary of the defence and publication of Michel Foucault's "History of Madness". This seminal work marks one of the turning points in the history of Western thought, especially in the human sciences, and provides a prepositional glimpse into the archaeological method developed by the French philosopher, which was further detailed in "The Archaeology of Knowledge" (2012), and which is so significant for Discourse Analysis.

The stage of Discourse Analysis has been set for the "Seminar on Madness - 60 years of Michel Foucault's History of Madness", which deserves congratulations for such an important initiative. It is within this scenario that this text also emerges as a manifestation of the celebration of Michel Foucault's "History of Madness in the Classical Age", as well as an attempt - it is important to emphasise that it is no more than an attempt - to expose some of the main ideas set out in its composition, including some regimes of knowledge and their practices. These and those are intimately articulated to establish discourses responsible for maintaining madness in certain historical periods, as will be seen below.

Having said that, there are many possible introductions to the "History of Madness in the Classical Age" that add to the discursive ballast in which this text is inserted. As a result, it would not be a desire, but rather a necessity, to make a selection of so many possible openings for dealing with regimes of knowledge and certain practices in the history of madness. Because I want to leave some openings, perhaps pointing to the fact that Michel Foucault himself took an active part in the French anti-asylum movement is one way. Another is to point out that he experienced the asylum apparatus and that this experience was part of the restlessness responsible for the gestation of his "History of Madness".

Another possibility when dealing with Foucault's seminal production is to start with the analytical method that he developed, but which many have already

done in other spaces. Therefore, just the fact that there are so many possibilities for entering his work enriches his discursive performance in a colossal way and, consequently, his responsiveness to different demands. Due to the multiplicity of its ideas, the regimes of knowledge, which constitute certain practices described as its material counterpart, constitute the recursive measure of a methodological determination for a horizontal reading of the "History of Madness in the Classical Age" to be made here later, that is, a census of some elements that are part of the history of knowledge.

For the purposes of demarcating the boundaries of the endeavour intended by this text, i.e. for an inside-out horizontal reading of the (Foucauldian) archaeology of certain regimes of knowledge and certain practices present in the discursiveness of the seminal work in question, it is essential to know that Michel Foucault draws a delimitation. This is properly linked to the "space-time" in his work, which comprises the classical age between two major milestones, the creation of the General Hospital in 1657 in Paris and the liberation of the shackles of the insane by Philippe Pinel in 1794 at the Bicêtre Hospital. In other words, it is research that, orbiting around madness, begins its rotation process in the middle of the 17th century and ends it at the end of the 18th.

Before the initial moment of the classical age postulated by Foucault, it is important to make it clear that there are some major events responsible for engendering the regimes of knowledge found within the "History of Madness". Perhaps the most significant is the Middle Ages, which, beyond a chronological marking of history, is shaped by the religious regime in which the responsibility of the individual was placed under the curatorship of the Catholic Church. "During the Middle Ages, it was relatively difficult to explain how it was possible to be held responsible for something, such as sinning, because if the person wasn't free and only fulfilled God's plans, how could they be held responsible?" (Santi, 1998, p. 37). In this way, madness was perceived as the realisation of metaphysical forces.

It is in the movement of urban, literary and philosophical "rebirth", among others, that another regime of knowledge brings a greater degree of responsibility to the individual, according to which they can choose actions and bear their consequences. In view of this, "In the Renaissance, the question can be equated

in another way: God made man free so that he can be judged; he can choose a good path and be rewarded for it, but he can be diverted from it by temptations and dispersions" (Santi, 1998, p. 37). However, the regime of religious knowledge, as a predominant model of practice, is not entirely separate from the European social circuit in which the Renaissance takes place (14th-16th centuries). There is a confrontation between the religious regime and Renaissance knowledge and practices.

Faced with the static nature of ecclesiastical power, "The Renaissance reintroduced the medical teaching practices of Hippocrates and Galen , for whom all illnesses were due to a non-specific imbalance of the body's components" (Amâncio, 2012, p. 51). The beginning of the erosion of religious power and, consequently, the linking of madness to metaphysical forces has one of its main milestones in the Renaissance. Hieronymus Bosch, a Renaissance painter, translates, with a certain irony in his painting, "The Extraction of the Stone of Madness" (1501) - perhaps a possible origin of the expression "stone madman" -, the "relationship" between emerging knowledge and practice and those stemming from the church, when dealing with madness as a phenomenon that can be interpreted under both one regime of knowledge and another.

Figure I: The Extraction of the Stone of Madness (1501).

Source: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Figura-7-Hieronymus-Bosch-Extracao-da-Pedra-da-Loucura_fig6_317594990

The picture above shows a probable doctor who, instead of wearing a cap, uses a kind of funnel and is performing surgery to extract an item from the head of a presumed madman. The procedure is observed and/or assisted by two clerical characters, a man holding a container and a woman with a book on her head. A knowledge and a practice that would later become a regime of scientific knowledge in the painting concerns the scientific firsts that place madness within the individual, that is, as belonging internally to its subject. In opposition to this

regime is the previous paradigm according to which madness is something external to its subject. Therefore, this Renaissance panorama, presented in an unpretentious way, precedes the "History of Madness in the Classical Age", producing its effects within it and providing the introduction to a horizontal reading of some regimes of knowledge and certain practices present in the discursiveness of this work.

2. REGIMES OF KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICES IN "THE HISTORY OF MADNESS IN THE CLASSICAL AGE"

The regimes of knowledge present in the work in question are relatively dispersed and are not formulated under the aegis of principles and/or epistemological propositions according to which certain discourses gain materiality in certain practices - one example is the characterisation of empiricism by a nuclearity of sensory experience; another is rationalism through intellectual activity; yet another is positivism through the organisational rigour "of laws that express constant relationships between phenomena observable in experience" (Giacoia Junior, 2010, p. 143) - especially the discourse on madness in the period between the middle of the 17th century and the end of the 18th century. 143) - especially the discourse on madness in the period between the mid-17th century and the end of the 18th century. With their associated practices, the main regimes of knowledge are: empiricist, rationalist and positivist. The first is more physicalist in character; the second is more mentalist; the third is more primitive. The aim here is not to identify these three regimes with the triadic division of the "History of madness in the classical age", but , rather, with the detection of the historicity belonging to each in terms of the composition of madness.

In considering this occurrence of strands, we begin a horizontal reading of some regimes of knowledge and certain practices present in the discursiveness of Michel Foucault's seminal work through empiricism, which enables man to test the veracity of his ideas through experience, disengaging himself from belief in metaphysical forces.

> It is not possible to give transcendental value to empirical contents or move them to the side of a constitutive subjectivity without giving way, at least silently, to an anthropology, that is, to a way of thinking in which the rightful

> limits of knowledge (and, consequently, of all empirical knowledge) are at the same time the concrete forms of existence, as they occur precisely in that same empirical knowledge (Foucault, 2000b, p. 342).

According to this regime, madness is a set of manifest and perceptible signs that exist outside a tacit standardisation. Here, the procedures for containing the self "fail" and, therefore, madness is understood as the negativity of "reason". In this case, the therapy of madness is confinement as the most immediate and rudimentary "curative" function of treatment and, consequently, "imprisonment" engenders a discourse to justify its own practice. As a result of this practice, madness borders on criminality, above all because it carries the moral evaluation, as Foucault sees it from the beginning to the end of his research, of the negativity of reason.

> We can see how, even in the empiricism of the means of cure, the great organising structures of the experience of madness in the classical era are once again to be found. Error and lack, madness is both impurity and solidity; it is a departure from the world and from truth, but it is also, precisely for this reason, a prisoner of evil (Foucault, 1972, p. 320).

The empiricist regime of knowledge, by focussing on madness in the experience carved into the body, encloses the body in the prison of madness, so as to build an enclosure for the insane. Now, the empiricist regime of knowledge has its founding nucleus in the body and, as a result, madness is proposed as an impropriety of the sensibility (un)available to the subject. "With madness, the case is different; if these dangers do not jeopardise the performance or the essence of its truth, it is not because such a thing, even in the thought of a madman, cannot be false, but rather because I, who think, cannot be mad" (Foucault, 1972, p. 46), because "When I believe that I have the right to think, I cannot be mad" (Foucault, 1972, p. 46). 46), because "When I believe that I have a body, I can be sure of possessing a more solid truth (...)" (Foucault, 1972, p. 46), but, "On the other hand, one cannot suppose, even through thought, that one is mad, because madness is precisely the condition of the impossibility of thought" (Foucault, 1972, p. 46).

As the viability of thought, there is the body. In the 17th century, René Descartes, another French philosopher, produced a profoundly rationalist theory based on the fact that in order to think, you need a body. This epistemological circumscription is the most significant for understanding an empiricist regime of

knowledge, because it translates the overdetermination of the body in relation to the other processes linked to madness.

> I didn't really have any doubts about the body and I thought I knew its nature very well. If I perhaps tried to describe it as my mind conceived it, I would explain it this way: by body I mean everything that can end in some figure, be circumscribed somewhere and fill a space from which it excludes every other body. It is perceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste and smell and is also moved in many ways, not by itself, but by another who touches it and from whom it receives the impression (Descartes, 2004, p. 47).

Therefore, within the empiricist regime, the "most solid truth", in addition to many other implications, is the first way of accessing madness and its unreason. The consequence of the irrefutable body-mind postulate is the "great internment", i.e. the reclusion of the mad figure in monasteries, leprosariums and prisons as a way of controlling the body. However, Humanism, as a movement to value the ambiguous nature of man from a spirit of criticism of the customs crystallised in the social circuit, emerges as a transition from this regime to another, the rationalist one. "One of the characteristics of Humanism and the Renaissance is the break with this tradition and the recognition of the value of practical or active life, of work and worldly activity" (Abbagnano, 2007, p. 199). In this way, madness, as expressed in the "History of Madness", is reflected in multiple manifestations under the aegis of Humanism.

Michel de Montaigne, the humanist thinker, said of madness: "And he is right to call madness any impulse, however praiseworthy, that goes beyond our own judgement and reasoning" (Montaigne, 2000, p. 156). The humanist thinker places reason in a place limited by judgement and reasoning, while he presents madness as an impulse that goes beyond reason in understanding the phenomenon of folly. Still in his "Essays", he continues: "Wisdom has its excesses and needs moderation as much as madness" (Montaigne, 2000, p. 263). As a result of this proposition, Montaigne, when he points to what is desirable, wisdom, and states that it is something in need of moderation, affirms that madness is a necessity for wisdom itself, likewise bringing together the scales of madness and wisdom, which measure precisely the antipodes of human functioning.

Humanism, as a movement of transition between regimes of knowledge, is the depository of the main criticisms levelled at reason and, in turn, is one of those responsible for elevating madness to the status of an examination of its own

wisdom, earned by the social nature of behaviour. "Our life consists partly of madness, partly of wisdom. Those who only write about it with reverence and by the rules leave more than half of it behind" (Montaigne, 2000, p. 310). The two sides of the same coin seem to be taken with relative equivalence because they are categories of the human constitution, although one receives greater validity and moral accent, as Foucault (1972) explains, within most social circuits.

It can be seen that madness is given a less deleterious and more encompassing reflexive approach, since Humanism is "the recognition of the value of man in his totality and the attempt to understand him in his world, which is that of nature and history" (Abbagnano, 2007, p. 518-519). Both for this reason and as a criticism of many of the customs of the time, the humanist thinker Erasmus of Rotterdam, in "Praise of Folly", from the point of view of the madman, says: "Do not think that I am speaking to you out of ostentatious wit, as most orators do. I, on the contrary, have always been very fond of saying everything that comes into my mouth" (Rotterdã, s/d, p. 16). According to this perspective, those who don't lie and therefore tell the truth spontaneously are closer to the madman.

The author of "The Praise of Folly" continues about the spontaneous movement that shapes folly: "It is nature, which has wisely given children a certain air of folly, by which they obtain a reduction in the punishments of their educators and become worthy of the affection of those who have them in their care" (Rotterdam, n.d., p. 24). Erasmus of Rotterdam, by turning to what is most naive and perhaps most authentic about madness, brings a perception of madness as something that everyone goes through at some point in their lives, or at least something that is close to everyone, including children themselves, who have a certain air of madness, perhaps of naivety, which makes us think of madness as very close to man and not so distant.

In order to bring madness closer to reason , the humanist thinker also tries to take the path of reasoning as capable of distinguishing concrete and abstract things in their associated characteristics, in such a way as to "perhaps" be a possible method for identifying the mad. However, the ironic procedure stands out when the objects of discernment are brought up, because the difference between a donkey and a donkey is only perceptible to someone who is absolutely versed in

dealing with them or to someone who knows animal genetics, in a similar way, the discrimination of a bad poem from an excellent one draws on metric, figurative and linguistic parameters, in other words, specialised, to subjective criteria of understanding, assimilation and resonance of the poetic material.

Therefore, Humanism, as a movement of artistic, literary and urban "renewal", among others, took part in criticising the customs and beliefs in force at the time, as well as being a means of transition from the predominance of the empiricist regime in understanding madness to the rationalist regime, attenuating a possible irruptive disjunction between the continuity of the former in relation to the latter. In other words, a regime of knowledge and its practices do not cease to exist, but they gradually lose relevance or space for action and / or pregnance at a given juncture. This is what happens with the emergence of interest in the body-mind paradigm, fuelled by rationalism. "With this, we would have the peak of humanism as the value of man in the world and his position as the centre. Man was already known as the centre of the world; now he himself has a centre, his reason, his self-consciousness" (Santi, 1998, p. 61, author's italics).

Figure II: Dr Tulp's anatomy lesson (1632)

Source: https://www.historiadasartes.com/sala-dos-professores/a-licao-de-anatomia-do-dr-tulp-rembrandt/

"Dr Tulp's anatomy lesson is a landmark illustrating the beginning of interest in the body-mind relationship" (Amâncio, 2012, p. 62-63, italics by the author). A work from the artistic period known as the Baroque, which, in general, is the translation of more rational thinking and, perhaps, in some cases of the arts, more far-fetched. In Rembrandt's painting, the most prominent man is Doctor Tulp, who is on a darker plane in relation to the body, whose anatomical function is more emphasised. In this way, what should be more prominent in the painting is given a protagonist and lighter tone in contrast to the adjacent and darker hue playing the background. In comparative terms, this interdependent contrast could be perceived between the empiricist and rationalist regimes of knowledge, in terms of the body

that wants to show itself when the tendons are projected and, consequently, how they move part of the body, specifically the arm itself and the fingers.

By leaving the body on the platform of the first evidence, Descartes turns to the reason of thought captured by the nuclearity of the rationalist regime of knowledge and, consequently, the maintenance of the absolute status of reason, in understanding the forms of manifestation of subjectivity, becomes a significant key to the conception of madness. Since madness is made up of "errors of the soul", with the moral component of failure, "The madman moves away from reason, but puts into play images, beliefs, reasoning found in the man of reason" (Foucault, 1972, p. 186). In other words, the madman, in his behaviour that diverges from the norm in the social circuit, moves away from linearised reason, producing a singularised "reason", because, as well as possessing thought, an existence that exceeds the body, he actualises rationality through his manifestations of madness.

The figure of the doctor, the holder of knowledge about madness, emerges within the regime of rationalist knowledge as the person who can say what madness is and what it is like. "Therefore, the madman cannot be mad for himself, but only in the eyes of a third party who alone can distinguish the exercise of reason from reason itself" (Foucault, 1972, p. 186). Since "madness is therefore a negativity" (Foucault, 1972, p. 251), the failure of reason receives its own functioning according to which there are positivities that gain attribution in the system of madness itself. In this way, a (medical) practice stemming from the rationalist regime of knowledge is the prescription of types of madness, as Foucault noted in the "History of Madness".

Among the main positivities of madness described are mania, melancholia, hysteria and hypochondria. The cure, or cessation of the positivities of madness, derives from the exchange between medical knowledge and certain therapeutic practices. As the actual causes of the positivities of madness are unknown, the process of trying to cure the symptoms of what is still called madness begins. Among the practices is the Consolidation of the spirits resulting from their stabilisation - the spirits (products of glandular secretion) are divided into inferior and superior (analogously to the Cartesian division of the human being into res extensa and res cogitans) - when flaccid and weakened into rigid and healthy.

Numerous practices, through the use of the complex semiological system of linguistic signs, make up part of the discursive production involved in the rationalist regime of knowledge. Michel Foucault, in "The History of Madness in the Classical Age", presents at least four of the practices according to which the core of the treatment of madness consists of a type of "art of discourse" in the restitution of a socially accepted standardised state of behaviour. Among these practices is "awakening" as a technique that the doctor himself can use to remove the insane person from their dreamlike condition, assuming that madness is a dysfunctional performance that can be corrected by compulsorily withdrawing from a delusional state.

Another practice, which is more sensitive to the condition in which the madman finds himself, is "theatrical realisation", in which the doctor, who is able to bring such an expedient to the fore, works on the basis of the madman's own reasoning, in other words, he uses elements of the narrative created by the patient under treatment to demonstrate, through a dialectical relationship, the incoherencies and inconsistencies of his reasoning, in order to extract the madman from his delirium. The "return to the immediate", on the other hand, is structured through the madman's removal of the unreal, the imaginary and desire, as these are considered harmful to the treatment of madness. Thus, even if it is through artificial elements external to the delirium, the insane person returns to their present moment, circumscribed by time, space and their immediate constituents. "Such practices demonstrate that "the essence of madness is considered as nature and as illness; it is an art of discourse and the restitution of truth where madness is worth as folly" (Foucault, 1972, p. 337, emphasis added).

The rationalist regime of knowledge gives rise to certain practices, seen above, and the figure of the doctor himself, holder of knowledge about madness, interwoven through the discursive threads of history, in the Enlightenment as the apex of the use and employment of reason for practically all purposes, by virtue of this being a "philosophical line characterised by the commitment to extend reason as a critic and guide to all fields of human experience" (Abbagnano, 2007, p. 534). The lights of knowledge, initially ignited by Humanism, gained social expressiveness through many different movements in the functioning of the social circuit, thus

affecting the understanding of madness, as can be seen in Voltaire's description of this notion in his "Philosophical Dictionary" (1764):

> We call madness that disease of the organs of the brain which prevents a man from thinking and acting like others. If he can't manage his property, he's banned; if he can't have ideas in accordance with society, he's excluded; if he's harmful, he's locked up; if he's angry, he's locked up. It's important to note, however, that this man doesn't lack ideas; he has them like everyone else while he's awake and often while he's asleep. One might wonder how his spiritual, immortal soul, lodged in his brain, receiving all ideas through the coordinated and divided senses, cannot conclude a sound judgement (Voltaire, 2008, p. 378-379).

The Enlightenment, as we can see from the annals of history and Voltaire's quote above, took reason to its most critical level and, when it turned its attention to madness, it brought about a kind of synthesis of the empiricist and rationalist regimes of knowledge that made it possible for a set of practices to emerge from a new regime of knowledge. This is the positivist regime of knowledge "which bases knowledge on positive laws that express constant relationships between phenomena observable in experience" (Giacoia Junior, 2010, p. 143). Once again, a movement of cultural "revolution" affects the set of knowledge regimes and their practices linked to madness, in such a way as to generate the prescription and systematisation of many practices stemming from the beginnings of positivism itself.

Suddenly, in a few years in the middle of the 18th century, a fear arose. A fear that is formulated in medical terms but which is basically animated by a whole moral myth. There was fear of a very mysterious evil that was spreading, it was said, from the boarding houses and would soon threaten the cities. There was talk of prison fever, the wagon of the condemned, those men in chains who travelled through the cities leaving behind a wake of evil. Imaginary contagions are attributed to scurvy, and it is predicted that air tainted by evil will corrupt inhabited neighbourhoods. And once again the great image of medieval horror imposes itself, giving rise to a second panic in the metaphors of astonishment. The internment house is no longer just the leprosarium away from the cities: it is leprosy itself in front of the city (Foucault, 1972, p. 357).

In the "History of Madness", this fear is described as the possibility of madness being infected by healthy people, just like other diseases that are responsible for "contamination". Thus, the places reserved for the insane had to be sterilised and kept away from urban centres because of the emerging fear. A

medical methodology stemming from positivist knowledge (in its early days) began to separate the sick person from other individuals who did not have the same change, since the possibility of transmission was on the horizon and it was necessary to isolate them. In this sense, the transmissible nature of the diseases known at the time is transferred to madness, fulfilling a postulate later formulated in classical positivism, which prescribes that "all our knowledge must be based on observations, that we must proceed either from facts to principles, or from principles to facts, and any other similar aphorisms" (Comte, 1978, p. 14).

Within the perspective of positivist knowledge, there are certain practices to contain the spread of madness. "At the moment, there is no way of suppressing the houses of internment; it is a question of neutralising them as possible causes of a new evil. It is a question of tidying them up and purifying them" (Foucault, 1972, p. 356). Based on this need, the places where the insane were locked up became more restricted to them and no longer to other types of subjects, such as criminals. "The great reform movement that would develop in the second half of the 18th century had its first origins there" (Foucault, 1972, p. 356), since one of its main initial objectives was to "reduce contamination by destroying impurities and vapours, reducing all these fermentations, preventing evil and maladies from vitiating the air by spreading their contagion through the atmosphere of cities" (Foucault, 1972, p. 356).

In this movement stemming from the positivist regime of knowledge, the fear of the contamination of madness is also transformed into a fear of certain practices considered capable of depriving their intense practitioners of reason, because many illnesses come from certain practices, in a sense considered to be the logic of actions that generate consequences. In the "History of Madness", Foucault sees the thematisation of this fear in three major figures circulating at the time. "Madness and freedom" for a society sutured by great discoveries and the expansion of work possibilities is an intertwining thematised by the fear of a growing practice of using freedom, which concerns the very split between paradigms, since "Freedom of conscience carries more dangers than authority and despotism" (Foucault, 1972, p. 363).

"Madness, civilisation and sensibility" is another thematisation of fear in the discourse on madness, found at a time when the sciences in general are undergoing a process of deepening, perfecting and using them in the social circuit. "If the progress of the sciences dispels error, it also has the effect of propagating a taste and even a mania for study; life in a cabinet, abstract speculations, this eternal agitation of the spirit without exercise of the body can have the most disastrous effects" (Foucault, 1972, p. 365). This seems to be the understanding, which still prevails in some niches today, that the study (and reading as one of its instruments) of phenomena concerning life, in its multiple variations of manifestation, can lead to madness due to the fact that study, through its necessary abstractions, can desensitise the subject who undertakes it, as it distances him from the sensible world and brings him closer to the world in which the madman lives.

In the second half of the 18th century, it [madness] will no longer be recognised in what brings man closer to an immemorial decadence or an indefinitely present animality; on the contrary, it is situated in those distances that man takes from himself, from his world, from everything that is offered to him in the immediacy of nature; madness becomes possible in this environment where man's relations with the sensible, with time, with the other are altered; it is made possible by everything that, in man's life and becoming, is a rupture with the immediate (Foucault, 1972, p. 368-38).

The great fear, which goes beyond the above thematisations, creates, within the French social space plagued by growing poverty, the relatively specialised retreat with other practices for the treatment of the insane. Consequently, until the retreat was developed and implemented, there were three institutions from which the regime of truth constituted madness: prisons, hospitals and the family. From this perspective, Foucault asserts that "It [madness] must no longer be inscribed in the negativity of existence, as one of its most abrupt figures, but must progressively take its place in the positivity of known things" (Foucault, 1972, p. 439). This is equivalent to saying that there is an addition to truth, reason and health, because madness brings them a knowledge hitherto not considered as such by other regimes of knowledge.

Within the positivist regime of knowledge, the retreat (or asylum) emerged with the reformers Samuel Tuke (England) and Philippe Pinel (France) and their practices. "In the Retreat, a human group is brought back to its most original and purest forms: it is a question of putting man back into elementary social relations and absolutely in keeping with his origin" (Foucault, 1972, p. 470). The functioning of the retreat prioritises the practices of essential relationships, seen above all in the following binomials: family-child, fault-punishment, madness-disorder. These are important for the positivist regime of knowledge, because in the practices adopted by the institution responsible for the retreat, they thematise paternal authority, immediate justice and social and moral order, with a view to the future reintegration of the madman into the social circuit. "Everything is organised so that the madman recognises himself in this world of judgement that surrounds him on all sides; he must know that he is being watched, judged and condemned; from fault to punishment, the link must be evident, like a guilt recognised by all" (Foucault, 1972, p. 494).

Therefore, as a turning point in a positivist regime of knowledge, the anthropological structure of the new psychiatry takes into account: man, madness and the truth of madness. This meant that the practices of treating madness were minimally humanised. In addition to the moral practices of calling the insane to account, which included light, moderate and severe punishments depending on the severity of the behaviour, the creation of the retreat by Samuel Tuke and Philippe Pinel fostered the new psychiatry, with a new symptomatology whose simplification can be seen in three major manifestations: General paralysis, Moral madness, Monomania.

Psychiatry, practised under this regime of positivist knowledge, which was later continued by Jean-Étienne Esquirol, underwent new changes in its practices. Jean-Martin Charcot was one of the forerunners of a treatment that was somewhat unusual for the late 19th century in France, with hypnosis as the main ingredient in his practices. André Brouillet (1887) depicts a session in which the doctor, surrounded by spectators, performs one of his procedures on a woman considered to be hysterical.

Figure III: A clinical lesson at the Salpêtrière (1887)

Source:https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/67/Une_le%C3%A7on_clinique_%C3%A0_la_Salp%C3%AAtri%C3%A8re.jpg

The emblematic figure of Charcot influenced many doctors, including Freud with the formulation of psychoanalysis and his treatment practice derived from the fact that hypnosis had not been well incorporated by him. The revolution started by Pinel, based on a positivist system of knowledge, was given new impetus by psychoanalysis, which considered madness according to the history of its subject, who in turn came to be understood within the history of society itself, in which repressive mechanisms constituted subjectivities. In this way, "psychoanalysis, sociology and nothing less than the 'psychology of cultures' were needed to show the connection that the pathology of history could secretly maintain with history" (Foucault, 1972, p. 374). Therefore, the "History of Madness in the Classical Age" reaches its end at its last methodologically delimited frontier, with the emergence of psychoanalysis and, consequently, a horizontal reading of certain regimes of knowledge and certain practices present in its discursiveness, opening up margins for many other investigations.

3. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In accordance with the aim of this text, madness has been described from the perspective of empiricist, rationalist and positivist knowledge that structures the modulations of understanding madness as an object of knowledge, according to which its own history traces different paradigms of approaches and, consequently, different discursive propositions capable of managing regimes of knowledge and their practices throughout a given conjuncture. We didn't try to exhaust any existing meanings about madness in any of the regimes of knowledge because it was

impossible to do so. Michel Foucault's "History of Madness in the Classical Age", by archaeologically interpreting madness from the multiple discursive manifestations available in its archive, promotes a series of entries at different levels along its established borders. It found ontological conceptions whose crossings through history constituted excluded subjectivities.

The complexity of madness fundamentally concerns human subjectivity, as can be seen in certain regimes of knowledge and their practices throughout the "History of Madness in the Classical Age". New regimes of knowledge formulate practices, according to the historical conditions in which they are inserted and according to which they act in the treatment of madness. The transition from a religious knowledge regime to an empiricist one allows, at the same time as opening the way for new investigations into the workings of the human body and subjectivity, considerations about a fragmented reason arising from weaknesses in the body. The transition from an empiricist regime of knowledge to a rationalist one fosters the ability to understand the cognitive production of the insane in parallel to standardised reason. In its early days, the positivist regime of knowledge broadened and deepened knowledge of madness, practising a kind of "education" for the insane.

In the 20th century, madness became increasingly the subject of pondering not only by the medical sciences, but also, as we have seen in its heterogeneous constitution in the "History of Madness", by other movements: literary, philosophical, artistic, among others. Surrealism, which disseminated many conceptions from the psychoanalytic field, marked the expressiveness of its works through reflections on the complexion of human subjectivity and, necessarily, turned to madness as one of the ways of experiencing life itself. "At a time when madness was still condemned, the Surrealists thematised it as part of every human being, and not as a disease that affected some" (Tavares; Noyama, 2019, p. 196). In Brazil, psychiatrist Nise da Silveira developed a deeply humanised treatment of madness based on artistic manifestations. "Nise replaced torture with a studio and discovered a completely new way of dealing with madness" (Tavares; Noyama, 2019, p. 200).

In a broadening of the discourses on historicised madness in the present day, the dissemination of knowledge regimes and their practices have also been

infused into the cultural entertainment industry, especially in the production of films. It's not uncommon to find a film whose narrative's driving force lies in overcoming an antagonist who is considered mad. An example of this, with all due respect, is the 2019 feature film "Joker", in which the dichotomy of good and evil is taken up by the figures of Batman and the Joker respectively. The latter, however, gains history in the fulfilment of his characteristics, so that his madness is perceived as a crescendo for which society is one of the driving forces. The Joker is one representation, among many, of those who have been cut off from welcome, solidarity and other feelings responsible for consolidating a subjectivity that is considered healthy.

In a new chapter in the history of madness, the film character with clown make-up, green hair and extravagant clothes can represent a kind of resistance to standardised behaviour, compulsory happiness and moral virtuousness. The Joker is the depository of the residues from the shocks that regimes of knowledge and their practices produce, so it is possible to presuppose what they can cause to subjectivity. Between nihilism and depression, atino and desatino, good and evil, madness seems to be able to express the reason for the (internal and external) clashes between the subject and society, but before that, it precipitates its subject into the place from which one cannot get out, into oneself.

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